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The current trend of academic analysis of the juvenile court
as a treatment organization and the emphasis on treatment
aspects of juvenile court activities have led to a popular assump-
tion that the court applies a criterion of need in dispensing its
services. A traditional legal analysis would suggest the applica-
tion of a criterion of overt act. Even if we assume that the
intention of juvenile court legislation is to apply some criterion
of need, the question then becomes one of how needs are
demonstrated or measured. A criterion of demonstrated need
brings one full circle to a requirement of overt act.
HE most recent development incorrection might be summarized
as follows:
A correctional institution should be
like a hospital. Just as a hospital has
separate sections or wards for the treat-
ment of different kinds of illnesses, so
should a correctional institution have
separate sections for the treatment of
different kinds of personalities. Just as a
hospital has several different kinds of
clinical services, so should a modern cor-
rectional institution have several kinds of
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clinical services for the examination, diag-
nosis, and treatment of different kinds of
disorders.
Such remarks reflect the general ap-
proach that antisocial behavior is an
illness, the remedy for which is dif-
ferentiated treatment.
A Treatment Approach
If we analyze correctional treat-
ment in terms of hospitalization, then
we might well ask: Does the court
become the admitting office?
If we analyze some~of what is being
said in the juvenile court field, the
comparison seems apropos. Consci-
ously or unconsciously, the treatment
enthusiasts reason somewhat as fol-
lows : Differentiated treatment is the
accepted remedy for antisocial be-
havior ; to be effective such treatment
must meet the needs of the person;
the needs of that person must then
be the critical element in determin-
ing the treatment; study and experi-
ence have shown certain common
needs among persons exhibiting anti-
social behavior; treatment facilities
cannot be created overnight and are
therefore established on a forecast
of certain demands; once facilities are
established, persons should be selected
on the basis of need for treatment.
The court then selects and admits for
treatment.
A parallel line of reasoning takes
off at the point where we say that
&dquo;study and experience have shown
certain common needs among persons
exhibiting antisocial behavior&dquo; and
goes on to say that further study
shows (or will show) that, if you
examine and analyze the life of the
person prior to his exhibiting anti-
social behavior, you will find that
certain of his needs are apparent.
Consequently, it behooves us, in the
interest of society and of the indi-
vidual, to attempt to fill these needs
at the earliest possible point in life.
If this is done, persons should be
selected who need treatment, and the
differentiated treatment should be
supplied. The court should select and
admit for treatment.
Each of these lines of reasoning can
be reinforced with strong and appeal-
ing economic arguments which com-
pare the cost to society of continuing
antisocial behavior with the cost of
effective treatment.
Those who conceive of the juvenile
court as a treatment organization
then conclude by reasoning that the
modern juvenile court has developed
differentiated services and facilities,
has the authority to require the use
of these services, and should therefore
select individuals for treatment ac-
cording to their needs.’
We must pause here to make it
clear that throughout this discussion
we are talking of the situation where
the treatment is imposed upon the
persons and not the situation where
the persons voluntarily seek help for
their needs. This is a cardinal distinc-
tion frequently overlooked or ignored
by persons comparing the juvenile
com t to other treatment organiza-
tions. The usual medical hospital or
clinic admits its patients on a volun-
tary basis, and they leave on a volun-
tary basis. They are neither restrained
nor constrained to accept treatment.
Freedom to accept or reject medical
or hospital care is protected even
when the government is paying the
expense of such care. In Michigan,
for example, the Amicted Children’s
Act provides as follows:
----
1 Cf. Orman W. Ketcham, "The Unful-
filled Promise of the Juvenile Court," Crime
and Delinquency, April, 1961, pp. 97-110.
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Nothing in this act shall be construed
as limiting the power of a parent or
guardian or person standing in loco
parentis to determine what treatment
or correction shall be provided for a
child.-Michigan Statutes Annotated,
§ 25.422 (22).
The government is empowered, of
course, to protect public health
against &dquo;dangerous communicable
diseases and contagious diseases.&dquo; But
can it be said that science is yet in
a position to prove the contagion of
delinquency or neglect? I think not,
and any such analogy must fail.
Doctrine of Overt Act
On the other hand, those who look
at the court from the point of view
of its judicial function have focused
on the questions surrounding the
initiation of court action. Starting
with the premise that in a democratic
society the individual is free to live
as he sees fit until he violates the
laws of society, they reason that there
must be a legal reason for the intru-
sion of court action into his life.
Even the best intended treatment rep-
resents such an intrusion, and when
it is ordered by a court it also repre-
sents coercion. In contemplating the
nature of a legal reason for court
action, they borrow from the back-
ground of law to say that a legal
reason is given when there is proof
of an overt act that violates the laws
of society.
&dquo;Overt act&dquo; as applied in the crim-
inal law embodies several concepts.
It includes the requirement that the
act which is made a crime be defined
clearly enough for a person to know
what is considered criminal. It in-
cludes the legal requirement of some
criminal intent by the accused. It
includes the rule that in addition
there must be some act or omission
by the person accused, that this act
or omission be defined in the law as
criminal, and that the act or omis-
sion include all the necessary ele-
ments to constitute a particular crime
as defined.2
For the purposes of this paper I
have given an abbreviated discussion
of the legal meaning of &dquo;overt act.&dquo;
Yet it should be enough to show that
it means something more than a phys-
ical act or omission, as shown in the
following examples:
Some act of commission or omission
lies at the foundation of every crime.-
State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617
(1951).
Criminal intent alone is not punish-
able.-Sherman v. United States, 10 F.2d
17 (C.C.A. Mich., 1926).
That which is unlawful is not neces-
sarily criminal.-Wallace v. Indiana, 232
Ind. 700, 116 N.E.2d 100 (1953).3
A mistaken belief, coupled with intent,
cannot make a lawful act a crime.-l~fis-
souri v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325, 133 S.W.2d
336 (1939).4
Conflicting Views?
We thus have two apparently con-
flicting views in the interpretation
of juvenile court laws. One says that
the juvenile court is primarily a treat-
2 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law &sect; 37 (1961).
3 In this case a man was prosecuted for
attempted suicide. The charge was ultimately
dismissed because it was found that while
suicide was unlawful in Indiana it was not
defined as a crime. Consequently, the at-
tempt could not be a crime.
4 In this case a man was prosecuted for
bribing a juror. He intended to bribe and he
committed the act of tendering the money,
but he was under the mistaken belief that
the man he approached was a juror&mdash;when
in fact he was not. Consequently, the charge
was dismissed.
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ment organization and its &dquo;clients&dquo;
are selected on the basis of need. The
other says that treatment is a sec-
ondary step, that the juvenile court
is first a juridical organization which
determines the violation of the laws
of society on the basis of the acts
of individuals and then orders treat-
ment when appropriate.
It will be the purpose of this paper
to explore some of the ramifications
of the &dquo;need&dquo; and &dquo;overt act&dquo; ap-




At this point we may dispose of
one related question. Some have
argued that the difficulty stems from
the inclusion of delinquency juris-
diction within the juvenile court, that
delinquency does not fit into the
parens patriae theory, the overall jus-
tification for juvenile courts.5 They
say that the inclusion of such juris-
diction was really an accidental by-
product of the effort to remove
children from deplorable prison con-
ditions and that it was obtained with-
out any real consideration of the
court proceedings or the legal rights
involved.6 They reason that the con-
flict between &dquo;need&dquo; and &dquo;overt act&dquo;
can be resolved by removal of delin-
quency jurisdiction from the juvenile
court. The finding of delinquency can
then be based upon proper proof of
an overt act in a more traditional
forum. At the same time the protec-
tive arm of the juvenile court can
be extended in neglect situations on
the basis of the needs of the children
or the family. The legal logic is that
the delinquency matter involves a
charge which may result in depriving
the child of his liberty. His liberty
is therefore entitled to safeguards
which our law has developed for its
protection. Among these safeguards
is proper proof of the overt act. They
dramatically point out that liberty
is restrained every bit as much in a
training school as in a jail or a
prison.
On the other hand a neglect
charge, they say, is aimed not at the
child but at the parents. They point
out that under the parens patriae
theory the state has an obligation to
supply parental guidance when such
guidance is not given by the natural
parents. The proceeding, therefore, is
to protect the child by implementing
this policy. It must then follow that
a true interpretation of the policy
provides for filling needs that are un-
met by the parents. It is therefore
appropriate, and within the policy,
for the court action to be determined
on the basis of needs not met by the
parents.
I suggest that this distinction is
illusory and not well founded and
that a historical and traditional legal
justification of this argument breaks
down when exposed to a basic theoret-
ical legal analysis.
Parents and Children : Rights
and Duties
Regardless of any question of per-
sonal liberty, the law and nature
have established a network of rights
between child and parent. These
rights generate corresponding recip-
rocal duties. Thus the right to cus-
5 Jack J. Rappeport, "Determination of De-
linquency in the Juvenile Courts: A Sug-
gested Approach," Washington Law Quarter-
ly, April, 1958, p. 123.
6 Edward Lindsey, "The Juvenile Court
from a Lawyer’s Standpoint," Annals, March,
1914, p. 143.
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tody implies a duty of the parent to
provide food and shelter and a cor-
responding duty of the child to live
with the parent. It is not necessary to
pursue this further for our purposes,
for it can readily be seen that such
an analysis can be made of every
conceivable right involved in the
parental relationship. At this point
it is necessary only to see that such
rights exist and that the law protects
the additional right of the child and
parent to develop their relationship
without interference from external
forces. The family can live as it sees
fit within the laws of society.
Consequently, when the child is in-
stitutionalized for a delinquency,
much more than his personal liberty
is involved: the natural and common
law rights of both parent and child
are violently affected. So also, when
a child is institutionalized for his
protection as a consequence of a neg-
lect action, the reason may be dif-
ferent but the result is the same, and
the same network of rights is violently
affected in the same way. (It seems
too obvious to mention that here
again, included in those rights, may
be the right of personal liberty.) The
same can be said of remedies less
severe than institutionalization. Fos-
ter care, whether ordered as a result
of delinquency or neglect, results in
a modification of the parents’ right
to custody and control and of the
child’s right to association with his
own parents. The essential legal ef-
fect is to modify the existing rights
and duties in both instances.
Societal Norms
In both situations society, protect-
ing itself against violations of its
norms, is declaring that certain be-
havior opposed to its interests will
not be tolerated. In one situation the
behavior is roughly equivalent to
criminal violations, while in the other
it may be criminal. The essential
fact remains that in both situations
society has decreed that certain con-
duct is inimical to its best interests.
You can make a tentative distinction
only if you are prepared to concede
that in one situation a penalty is im-
posed as punishment. Even then, as
we have seen, the distinction breaks
down for, in terms of the legal rights
and duties, the effect remains the
same.
For these and related reasons I
suggest that a transfer of delinquency
jurisdiction from the juvenile court
would not and does not resolve the
conflict between &dquo;need&dquo; and &dquo;overt
act.&dquo;
While there is some reason for
believing that the establishment of
the juvenile court was an emotional
reaction to certain social conditions
prevailing at the time,7 let us assume
that the early drafters and those who
followed did know what they were
doing. Let us assume they intended
to establish a new kind of organiza-
tion that would perform a new func-
tion in government.
What were to be the criteria by
which this organization operated?
Every organization has criteria for
admission. Even your local luncheon
club establishes criteria for admission
to membership.
Statutory Construction
Was need to be the sole criterion
for the juvenile court? Is it fair to
say that the framers of juvenile court
legislation intended to reject com-
7 Herbert H. Lou, Juvenile Court in the
United States (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1927) .
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pletely all elements of the concept
of overt act? We have seen that many
principles and rules are bound up in
that one term. Certainly, if such a
sweeping revision were intended, the
drafters would have said so explicitly.
In fact, it is a general rule of statu-
tory construction that statutes will
not be interpreted so as to impliedly
abrogate well-grounded, existing com-
mon law rights.8 It is also true, as a
general rule, that statutes will be
strictly construed when restrictive to
individual rights.9
We can reasonably suppose that
the framers of juvenile court legisla-
tion were aware of existing law and
existing rules of statutory construc-
tion ; consequently they would have
been explicit if they had intended
to make such a drastic change.
I am not aware of any juvenile
court legislation which provides that
&dquo;proceedings shall be undertaken to
determine the needs of juvenile ...&dquo;
or includes language of similar import.
Nor am I aware of statutory lan-
guage such as &dquo;The juvenile court
shall assume jurisdiction of juveniles
within the county according to their
individual needs....&dquo; I have no
knowledge of any statute that uses
the term &dquo;need&dquo; in its definition of
the court’s jurisdiction.
The unvarying pattern of such
legislation is to define court jurisdic-
tion in terms of certain factual situa-
tions that involve actions or omis-
sions of individuals and provide a
basis for court proceedings, as illus-
trated in the follomng:
One who habitually violates the law or
otherwise spends time improperly....
-Iowa Code Annotated, § 232.3.
Child leading injurious life ... [or]
has committed a violation of law or ordi-
nance....-Louisiana Revised Statutes,
1960 Supp. § 13.1570.
Neglected, in an injurious situation,
uncontrollable or accused of crime....
-Baldwin’s Kentucky Statutes Annotated,
ch. 208, § .020.
The child shall be alleged to have com-
mitted a violation of law.-Florida Stat-
utes Annotated, ch. 39.03 (b).
(1) Who has violated any municipal
ordinance or law of the state or of the
United States; ... (2) Who has deserted
his home without sufficient cause ... (3)
Who repeatedly associates with immoral
persons....-Michigan Statutes Anno-
tated, § 27.3178 (598.2).
Liberal Construction Clause
Granted, a majority of such statutes
also include a liberal construction
clause usually containing language
similar to this:
... shall be liberally construed so that
the care, custody and discipline of the
children brought before the court shall
approximate as nearly as possible that
which they should receive from their par-
ents.-Annotated Laws of Massachusetts,
ch. 119, § 53.
What is frequently overlooked is
that this direction of liberal construc-
tion pertains to the disposition,
which is subsequent to the determi-
nation that the child is an appro-
priate one for court concern. The
initial determination for court ac-
tion must depend upon the proof of
acts or omissions defined in the
statutes.
Juvenile court legislation has
added one thing more. While defin-
ing acts and omissions which give
rise to a cause for action, it goes on
to say that even then action is not
automatically necessary. Most of our
statutes add the additional provision
8 50 Am. Jur., Statutes &sect; 403 (1944, rev.
1962).
9 Id., &sect; 407.
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that action must be in the best in-
terests of the child or the commu-
nity.i° Consequently, even though the
factual situation may be proven, the
matter may be dismissed if in the
judgment of the court further action
would not be of benefit to either
the child or the community.&dquo;
Assuming a Doctrine of Need
Let us suppose for the moment
that, in spite of a determined effort
at objectivity, this interpretation of
juvenile court legislation is so fla-
vored by my legal background that
it is in fact erroneous. And let us
suppose that although they were not
explicit, the framers of juvenile court
legislation did intend that a criterion
of need should be applied in the
determination of court action.
How, then, was this need to be
determined? Were we to trust the
subjective judgment of the case-
worker ? I think not. No matter how
highly trained? I think not. We need
only point out that the legislation
created a court, with a judge, to show
that the intention was to have this
decision made by someone who was
apart from the investigative and case-
work process.
How, then, was the need to be com-
municated to this objective third
party? By the use of the senses, as in
any communication-by visual aids
and the written and the spoken word.
Since a judgment is to result, the
communication is to be tested for
validity and reliability. What was to
be the basis or foundation for these
words? The words must of necessity
describe factual situations known to
the one communicating and, in addi-
tion, may convey the opinion of the
one communicating. However, opin-
ions are not formed in a vacuum.
Opinions are based upon knowledge
applied to a given factual situation.
Consequently, the essential basis of
the written or spoken word com-
municated to the one making the
judgment is some kind of factual
situation.
What kind of factual situation did
the framers of the legislation have in
mind which would serve as a basis for
these communications? We cannot es-
cape the fact that they stated explicit-
ly the factual situations they had in
mind. These situations are given in
the statutes as definitions and as a
basis for a court proceeding. In other
words, even though we assume for
the sake of exposition an intended
concept of need, the legislative drafts-
men stated that the need would be
demonstrated by the conduct of a
person in certain given situations. In
effect, then, the framers are saying
that one who violates a law or or-
dinance may have demonstrated by
this conduct a certain kind of need,
that one who habitually associates
with immoral persons may demon-
strate by this conduct a certain kind
of need, and that one who is neg-
lected or injuriously situated is placed
in a factual situation which may dem-
onstrate a certain kind of need.
Elements of Demonstrated Need
If we are correct in this reason-
ing, then we have shown that one of
the primary elements of &dquo;overt act,&dquo;
the act of commission or omission, is
also an intrinsic element in the ap-
plication of a concept of need, for
it is essential to the described factual
situation.
10 Downs, Michigan Juvenile Court: Law
and Practice (Ann Arbor: Institute of Con-
tinuing Legal Education, 1963) , p. 66.
11 Cf. In re Sanders, 168 Neb. 458, 96 N.W.
2d 218 (1959) .
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Our discussion of overt act above
mentioned two additional elements:
intention of the individual and pro-
hibition by the people.
Who is there to argue that the ele-
ment of intent, willfulness, malice
-call it what you will-enters into
the evaluation of given conduct when-
ever we assess the person’s treatment
needs? Rarely indeed is an act con-
demned, no matter how objection-
able, when it is clearly accidental or
involuntary. In common parlance we
say it is &dquo;blameless.&dquo; This is not to
say that we demand a specific intent
to accomplish a specific result. We
do demand that the person must have
been in control of his faculties and
aware of his actions. Consequently,
I believe it fair to say that the degree
of intention within the described fac-
tual situation is always an element
in the determination of the person’s
needs for treatment.
We come now to the element of
some act or omission that is pro-
scribed by society. I would be the
first to agree that in interpreting juve-
nile court legislation we do not re-
quire the particularity of description
that has been traditional in the crim-
inal law. Nevertheless, it would be
folly to say that this element of a
violation of an accepted norm is lack-
ing. Certainly, a youth who behaves
in a manner acceptable to other mem-
bers of society will not be the subject
of court action. He attracts court at-
tention only when he behaves in a
manner contrary to the accepted
norms of society as a whole. It is only
then that people see him as different
and in need of treatment.
Logic and experience clearly sup-
port the notion that a &dquo;violation&dquo; is
one of the elements of demonstrated
need. At the same time our society
has had great difficulty in establish-
ing the norms by which to judge
violation, the standard of conduct we
wish to require. Consequently, the
juvenile court has had great difficulty
in interpreting the statutes. The lan-
guage of juvenile court law is vague
and ambiguous, subject to divergent
interpretation. Uncertain norms make
it difficult, if not impossible, to de-
fine legal duties with a reasonable
degree of certainty. But this is a
separate problem; it does not affect
the analysis of the theoretical ele-
ments of a demonstrated need.
We can conclude, then, that the
concepts of overt act and of need
are not mutually exclusive. Critical
analysis and objective application of
a concept of need require a demon-
strated need; a demonstrated need
involves the same essential elements,
perhaps in varying proportions, as a
legal concept of overt act. I submit,
finally, that one of the difficulties en-
countered in harmonizing these views
has been an insistence on subjective
determinations, along with a misun-
derstanding of the various ingredi-
ents of the decisions or judgments
involved.
